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CHAPTER 16 
Labor Relations 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS 
A. FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
§16.1. Wage and hour act amendments. The Fair Labor Stan-
dards Amendments was one of the few federal labor enactments of the 
1966 SURVEY year.1 These amendments increased the minimum wage 
and extended coverage of the Wage and Hour Act to an estimated 
eight million additional workers. These included a half million farm 
laborers, and non-farm employees in retailing, transit, restaurants, 
hotels, motels, hospitals, schools, taxi companies, and laundry and 
dry-cleaning establishments.2 For employees previously covered by the 
act and whose present minimum wage is $1.25 per hour, the 1966 
amendments provide an increase to $1.40 per hour effective February 
I, 1967, with a further increase to $1.60 per hour effective February 
1, 1968. 
Another major modification provided by the amendments is a 
change in the dollar amount in the definition of "enterprise," i.e., 
those retail and service establishments which are subject to the provi-
sions of the act. The present amount of $1 million in gross receipts 
will be lowered to $500,000 on February 1, 1967, and to $250,000 
beginning February 1, 1969. 
§16.2. Bills not passed. There was more discussion and interest 
in the bills not passed by the second session of the 89th Congress than 
in those that were passed,! Repeal of Section 14(b) of the National 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS is a partner in the firm of Morgan. Brown. Kearns & JoY. 
Boston. 
§16.l. 1 Pub. Law 89·601. amending Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 29 U.S.C. 
§§201-219 (1964). 
2 Employees in the non-farm industries who are newly covered will be entitled to 
a minimum wage of $1.00 per hour beginning February I. 1967. with periodic 
increases to $l.60 by 1971. The newly covered farm laborers must be paid at least 
$l.00 per hour starting February 1. 1967. with annual increases of 15¢ per hour to 
$1.30 on February I. 1969. 
§16.2. 1 One bill passed in the field of labor relations was an amendment to the 
Railway Labor Act. 45 U.S.C. §§151-188 (1964). which was signed into law on June 
20. 1966. It permits the establishment of special adjustment boards to help eliminate 
the backlog of undecided minor disputes now pending before the National Railroad 
Adjustment Board. A further amendment to the act permits an employee who is 
aggrieved by an award of the Adjustment Board or any of its divisions to file a 
petition for review of the order in any United States District Court. Similar relief 
is provided for falure of the Adjustment Board to make an award. 
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Labor Relations Act, as amended,2 was the chief goal of organized 
labor in 1966. Section 14(b) permits the states to prohibit a union 
shop contract. Such a state law is commonly referred to as a state 
"right to work" law. The bill to repeal Section 14(b) was passed by the 
House, but a filibuster blocked it in the Senate. Further consideration 
of the bill in the Senate during 1966 was dropped after three attempts 
to impose cloture failed. 
Also failing to pass were bills relating to civil rights and employ-
ment, the imposition of federal standards for unemployment compen-
sation, situs-picketing in the construction industry, and a special joint 
resolution designed to get the striking airline mechanics back to work. 
B. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
§16.3. Federal pre-emption. During its recent term, the United 
States Supreme Court considered several cases involving the issue of 
federal pre-emption in the labor relations field and decided that 
three cases fell within the exceptions to the general pre-emption rule. 
In the first of these cases, Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of 
America, Local 114,1 the issue was the extent to which the National 
Labor Relations Act2 pre-empts the maintenance of a civil action for 
libel under state law. The libel suit was brought under Michigan tort 
law. It was instituted in federal district court in Michigan on the basis 
of diversity of citizenship by Linn, who was an assistant general man-
ager of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, Inc. Suit was filed 
against the union, two of its officers, and a Pinkerton employee who 
was a union member and who had circulated the leaflets in question. In 
his complaint, Linn alleged that he had been libeled by leaflets circu-
lated among employees,S since he was one of the managers referred to 
in the leaflets, and that the statements were "wholly false, defamatory 
and untrue."4 Linn prayed for one million dollars in damages. Both the 
district court and circuit court of appeals dismissed the case on the 
ground that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive juris-
diction, based on their reading of the Garmon case.5 The Supreme 
Court reversed. The conclusion of the Supreme Court was that "where 
261 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. §141 (1964). 
§16.3. 1383 U.S. 53, 86 Sup. Ct. 657, 15 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1966). 
261 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. §164(b) (1964). 
S These stated in part: "The men in Saginaw were deprived of their right to vote 
in three N.L.R.B. elections. Their names were not summitted [sic]. These guards 
were voted into the Union in 1959! These Pinkerton guards were robbed of pay 
increases. The Pinkerton manegers [sic] were lying to us - all the time the contract 
was in effect. No doubt the Saginaw men will file criminal charges. Somebody may go 
to jaill" (Emphasis in original.) 383 U.S. 53,56,86 Sup. Ct. 657, 660, 15 L. Ed. 2d 582, 
586 (1966). 
4 Ibid. 
5 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 Sup. Ct. 773, 
3 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959), discussed in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§13.7, 13.9. See also 
1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.2; 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.5. 
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either party to a labor dispute circulates false and defamatory state-
ments during a union organizing campaign, the court does have juris-
diction to apply state remedies if the complainant pleads and proves 
that the statements were made with malice and injured him."6 
Prior to the institution of the present action, the employer (Pinker-
ton) had filed unfair labor practice charges under Section 8(b)(I)(a) of 
the act. The Regional Director had refused to issue a complaint, find-
ing that there was no agency relationship between the union and the 
employee who had circulated the offending leaflets. 
In the Garmon case, the United States Supreme Court had estab-
lished the doctrine that state court jurisdiction is pre-empted and state 
courts must defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor 
Relations Board when the activity which is the subject matter of the 
state litigation is "arguably" protected by Section 7, or prohibited by 
Section 8 of the act. However, the majority opinion of Justice Frank-
furter did recognize exceptions to the general rule, namely, that the 
states need not yield jurisdiction where the activity regulated was 
only a "peripheral" concern of the Labor Management Relations Act 
or where the regulated conduct touched interests "so deeply rooted in 
local feeling and responsibility that in the absence of compelling con-
gressional direction it could not be inferred that Congress had de-
prived the states of the power to act."7 The Supreme Court now holds 
that a suit for malicious libel falls within the exception.s 
The Court did place some restrictions on its ruling since it was con-
cerned with infringing the free speech rights granted under Section 
8(c) of the federal act. It therefore limited the availability of state 
remedies for libel to "those instances in which the complainant can 
show that the defamatory statements were circulated with malice and 
caused him damage."9 A plaintiff, then, may still not recover where a 
state court finds libel per se without proof of actual harm. But the 
actual harm may include general injury to reputation, mental suffer-
ing, pecuniary loss, or whatever form of harm would be recognized by 
state tort law. Moreover the party must establish that the "defamatory 
6383 U.S. 53, 55, 86 Sup. Ct. 657, 659, 15 L. Ed. 2d 582, 586 (1966). 
7 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243·244, 79 Sup. Ct. 
773, 779, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 782 (1959). Mass picketing and violence are within the 
exception and such conduct is therefore subject to state regulation although it is 
also prohibited as a union unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)(I) of the act. 
S According to the Court "the labor movement has grown up and must assume 
ordinary responsibilities and the malicious utterance of defamatory statements in 
any form cannot be condoned." 383 U.S. 53, 63, 86 Sup. Ct. 657, 663, 15 L. Ed. 2d 
582,590 (1966). The Court observed that the fact that the defamation occurs during 
a labor dispute does not give the Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction to 
remedy the consequences of such defamation. Justices Black and Fortas issued 
strong dissents. Justice Fortas saw the arming of participants in a labor-management 
dispute with the weapon of libel suits as a real threat to what he referred to as 
painstakingly achieved stabilization in labor·management relations and as a poten-
tially disruptive force thrown into the comprehensive structure created by Congress 
for resolving such disputes. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas joined in 
Mr. Justice Fortas' dissent. 
9Id. at 65, 86 Sup. Ct. at 664, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 591. 
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statements [were] published with knowledge of their falsity or with 
reckless disregard of whether they were true or false." The plaintiff 
must also show that he has suffered some sort of compensable harm as 
a prerequisite to the recovery of additional punitive damages.10 
A second pre-emption case, Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers 
Beneficial Associationp involved the intriguing issue of whether a 
state is excluded from regulating picketing aimed at organizing super-
visors. In Wisconsin, where the case arose, organizational picketing is 
unlawful and enjoinable. Pre-emption principles would prohibit the 
courts of such a state from enjoining organizational picketing where 
the employer being picketed is within the jurisdiction of the National 
Labor Relations Act. In the present case, although the employer was 
subject to the federal act, the individuals (marine engineers) within 
the particular group involved were supervisors who, under the defini-
tion of the term "employees" in the federal act, are specifically ex-
cluded from its coverage. The United States Supreme Court held that 
in such a situation state action was not pre-empted. The picketing, 
which was designed to organize supervisors, was held to be neither 
protected nor prohibited by the federal act. The possibility that the 
union's conduct might involve secondary activity prohibited by the 
federal act was disregarded as "too minimal to deserve recognition." 
The supervisors involved had been covered by a contract with the 
union, but a majority of them informed the company by written peti-
tion that they no longer wished to be represented by the union. When 
the company declined continued recognition of the union, the union 
started picketing. The company tried to get relief from the NLRB by 
seeking an election and by filing an unfair labor practice charge, but 
was unsuccessful because of the supervisory status of the individuals 
involved. The Court appeared sympathetic to the company and its 
supervisors, who lacked any federal remedy, and unsympathetic with 
the union's purpose, which it described as "forcing its representation 
on unwilling engineers."12 
A third case dealing with pre-emption arose under the Federal Rail-
road Compulsory Arbitration Act,13 In Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R.R. CO.,14 interstate 
railroads operating in Arkansas brought an action in the United States 
District Court. They prayed that the court declare two Arkansas stat-
utes unconstitutional and enjoin the State Attorney from enforcing 
10 Ibid. 
11382 U.S. 181, 86 Sup. Ct. 327, 15 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1965). 
12Id. at 181, 86 Sup. Ct. at 328, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 255. The Linn and Hanna Mining 
cases led Sanford H. Kadish, Professor of Law at the University of California, 
Berkeley, to express the view that the Supreme Court had taken the "escape 
hatches" in Garmon and enlarged them into "jagged holes." Sanford H. Kadish, 
in an address before the Section of Labor Relations Law, American Bar Association, 
in Montreal, August 8, 1966. 
13 Pub. Law 88·108, 77 Stat. 132, 45 U.S.C. following §157 (1964), and Arbitration 
Award Number 282 pursuant thereto. 
14 382 U.S. 423, 86 Sup. Ct. 594, 15 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1966). 
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the statutes, on the basis that they were pre-empted by the Arbitration 
Act. The Arkansas statutes involved were so-called "full crew" statutes, 
enacted prior to World War II, which provided for a minimum num-
ber of employees in designated job classifications (including that of 
fireman) on train crews. The railroads contended that the state statutes 
were in conflict with the Federal Railroad Compulsory Arbitration Act 
of 1963 and, specifically, with Arbitration Award Number 282. The 
United States Supreme Court upheld the position of the state of 
Arkansas on the pre-emption issue, finding that the history of the act 
indicated that Congress' only intent in enacting the legislation was to 
avert temporarily a railroad strike. The dispute over crew size and 
makeup, particularly in respect to firemen, was the basic cause of the 
bargaining impasse which in turn prompted the passage of the Arbitra-
tion Act. But the Court held that the scheme of the act and the awards 
under it were not intended to produce ultimate resolution of the 
issues of feather-bedding and full crews, but only to avert a threatened 
rail strike with reliance in the final instance being placed on the 
processes of collective bargaining to produce the desired and uniform 
standards for train crews. Hence, the Court concluded that no conflict 
existed between the state's full crew laws and the Congressional act. 
In a fourth case,15 the Court overturned a verdict in favor of a 
former supervisor who brought suit against an International Union 
for loss of employment due to violence and secondary boycott activi-
ties, partly on pre-emption grounds.16 
§16.4. Section 301 suits. In United Auto Workers v. Hoosier 
Cardinal Corp.,l the United States Supreme Court was faced with the 
question of what time limitation to apply to a Section 301 cause of 
action. Nowhere in the act is there a provision for any time limitation 
upon the bringing of an action under Section 301 for violation of a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
Seven years after the original claim occurred, the union filed suit on 
behalf of the employees in the federal district court in Indiana for 
vacation pay alleged to be owed under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. The suit was dismissed on the basis that it was barred by the 
Indiana six-year statute of limitations. The union in its appeal argued 
that it was for the federal courts to devise a uniform time limitation 
since federal labor law, according to the Lincoln Mills2 and Lucas 
15 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 Sup. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 
218 (1966). 
16 The verdict was for $174,500, including $100,000 in punitive damages. The 
Court held that part of the damages was due to peaceful picketing which began 
after the first two days of violence, and was therefore pre-empted in part. Another 
ground for reversal was the lack of "clear proof" of the international union's 
authorization or participation in the violence, which is required by Section 6 of 
the Norris-La Guardia Act. 
§16.4. 1382 U.S. 808, 86 Sup. Ct. 1107, 15 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1966). 
2 Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 Sup. Ct. 
912, 7 L. Ed. 2d 972 (1957). See 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §25.l; 1959 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §13.l7; 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.1. 
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Flour? cases, applies to Section 301 suits. The Supreme Court decided 
that, as a matter of federal law, the timeliness of a Section 301 suit is 
to be determined "by reference to the appropriate state statute of 
limitations. " 
C. FEDERAL DECISIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
§16.5. Jurisdictional dispute: Arbitration. During the 1966 SUR-
VEY year, the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided a relatively large 
number of labor cases.! A particularly interesting decision, Sheet Metal 
Workers International Union v. Aetna Steel Products Corp.,2 involved 
a confused situation relating to the arbitration of a jurisdictional dis-
pute between two unions under "Local Board" and "Appeals Board" 
procedures recently set up to deal with such disputes in the construc-
tion industry. The action was under Section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act to enjoin the 
enforcement of an arbitration award. The court stated that no less 
support should be given agreements between unions to resolve juris-
dictional disputes than to collective bargaining agreements between 
management and unions. The question of whether the arbitration 
award was a nullity because of alleged procedural defects, which one 
of the unions sought to have the court review, was itself subject to 
resolution by the as-yet-unexhausted arbitration machinery as set up 
by the parties. By leaving this matter to the arbitration process, the 
court said that it was only giving support to the "arbitral jurisdiction."s 
The facts of the case tend to show that the arbitration process itself 
can become as complex as some court litigation and that arbitration 
does not always provide either a speedy or effective resolution of a 
labor dispute. 
§16.6. Duty to bargain. The employer's duty to bargain under 
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act was involved in 
several of the First Circuit decisions. In the case of Sylvania Electric 
Products, Inc. v. NLRB,1 the court upheld the Board's finding that 
the employer had violated its statutory duty to bargain by refusing to 
furnish the union with a breakdown of the cost of its proposed "pack-
age" which included improvements in existing welfare programs. The 
union requested the cost information on the company's proposed wel-
fare package for the asserted reason that it might prefer higher wages 
S Teamsters, Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 82 Sup. Ct. 571, 7 L. Ed. 
2d 593 (1962). 
§16.5. 1 In addition to the cases discussed in the text of this section and those 
noted in §16.7., note 5, infra, the court decided Local No.2, International Brother-
hood of Telephone Workers v. International Brotherhood of Teleprone Workers, 
62 L.R.R.M. 2666 (1st Cir. 1966), in which it held that an increase in union dues was 
void because the statutory requirements had not been complied with. 
2 359 F .2d 1 (1st Cir. 1966). 
SId. at 7. 
§16.6. 1358 F.2d 591 (1st Cir. 1966). 
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over increased benefits. The employer had not raised inability to pay 
as a factor and refused the request for the information on the grounds 
that "it bargained on the level of benefits, not costS."2 
In 1961, in a case involving the same company, the First Circuit in 
reversing the Board, held that an employer did not violate its duty to 
bargain when it refused to comply with the union's request to furnish 
information as to the current and past costs being paid by the com-
pany for its non-contributory group insurance plan.s The court there 
held that although the benefits to employees from the plan constituted 
"wages" as to which the employer must bargain, nevertheless, the cost 
of such a plan was neither "wages" nor a "condition of employment" 
within the meaning of the act. In the 1966 case, the First Circuit did 
not overrule its previous holding, but ruled that meaningful bargain-
ing as to wages and conditions of employment, which are mandatory 
subjects of bargaining under the act, may require a party to disclose 
information on matters which are not themselves subject to manda-
tory bargaining. In other words, a party who refuses requested infor-
mation that would "significantly aid" the bargaining process, only for 
the sake of keeping the other party in the dark, may not be complying 
with its statutory duty to bargain. 
In NLRB v. David Buttrick Co.} Local No. 380, affiliated with the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, had alleged before the Board 
that the Buttrick Company had refused to bargain in good faith. But-
trick responded by arguing that Local No. 380 was subject to a "dis-
qualifying conflict of interest." One of the international union's pen-
sion funds had outstanding a loan of nearly five million dollars to 
Whiting Milk Company, a major competitor of Buttrick. Buttrick 
alleged that the local's subservience to the international union, and 
the international's interest in protecting this very substantial loan, 
could cause action to be taken by the local that would be adverse to 
the interests of both Buttrick and its employees. 
The Board found a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and ordered Buttrick 
to bargain with Local No. 380. The court declined enforcement of the 
Board's order, and remanded the case to the Board for reconsidera-
tion. The court, in an exhaustive and scholarly treatment of the issue, 
saw in the growth of union pension funds an increasing possibility of 
conflict between investment protection and worker representation 
motives. The court viewed the essential issue as "the interrelationship 
of powers and temptations created by the Fund's loans to a competitor 
of respondent."5 The Board should have considered not only the 
matter of the innate dangers involved but also the effect these dangers 
might have on the bargaining process. The court suggested that the 
Board consider the feasibility of devising reasonable safeguards against 
2Id. at 592. 
3 Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1961), noted 
in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.9. 
4361 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1966). 
:; Id. at 304. 
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such dangers. "What might have been a unique case twelve years ago 
will be a commonplace of tomorrow if suitable guidelines and safe-
guards are not devised."6 
§16.7. Bargaining unit. Two cases in the First Circuit involved 
the question of the propriety of the Board's finding that a single store 
in a chain was an appropriate bargaining unit. The Board had in both 
cases held the single store appropriate. In NLRB v. Primrose Super 
Market of Salem, Inc.} the court enforced the Board's order to bargain 
and upheld the Board's conclusion that the commission of Section 
8(a)(I) violations barred the company from asserting a defense of a 
good faith doubt as to the appropriateness of the unit. The court dis-
tinguished a subsequent Board case, Clermont's, Inc.,2 in which the 
Board ruled to the contrary, on the ground that the Section 8(a)(I) 
violations in Clermont's, Inc., were "minor and unconnected with the 
refusal to bargain" as compared with "a substantial and continuing 
course of misconduct" in Primrose. In the second case on this issue, 
NLRB v. Purity Food Stores, Inc.,s the court declined to enforce the 
Board's order and remanded the case on the grounds that the Board's 
finding "ignores substantial parts of the record and misstates and mis-
construes other parts." The severe criticism of the Board's findings was 
accompanied by a footnote reminde~ that "there is a heavy burden on 
parties who seek to claim that the Board's findings are not warranted."4 
This cautionary comment was added "because counsel in other cases 
have, in the past, taken far too much encouragement from our occa-
sional reversals of the Board."5 
Another appropriate bargaining unit issue was involved in S. D. 
Warren Co. v. NLRB.6 The court upheld the Board's finding that the 
engineering division of a plant was an appropriate unit. It was one of 
ten separately supervised divisions of a paper mill and its functions 
were maintenance, construction, utilities, and related operation work. 7 
6Id. at 309. 
§16.7. 1353 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1965). 
2154 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (1965). 
3354 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1965). 
4Id. at 930 n.19. 
5 Ibid. The First Circuit upheld in full the NLRB's orders against employers in 
these three cases: NLRB v. Lipman Brothers, Inc., 355 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1966); NLRB 
v. Yale Manufacturing Co., 356 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Sea-Land Service, 
Inc., 356 F.2d 955 (1st Cir. 1966). The court also upheld in full the NLRB order 
against a union in a secondary picketing case. NLRB v. Local 254, Building Service 
Employees International Union, 359 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1966). But the Board was 
reversed in NLRB v. Silver Bakery Inc., 351 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1965), on the ground 
that the act's six·month statute of limitations was a bar. The initial charge, which 
was within the six-month period, had been withdrawn with the Board's consent. 
The court commented that this should not "leave in the Board a roving discretion to 
determine that so-called equities warrant the reinstitution of the proceedings 
without limit of time" and it is immaterial that "the Board may feel that its 
discretion is benignly exercised." 
6353 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1965). 
7 The court held the unit was not a "gerrymander," nor was it "irrational," 
"arbitrary," or "capricious." 
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§16.8. Discharge for union activity. NLRB v. Joseph Antell, Inc. 
and NLRB v. Malone Knitting Co. were decided together by the First 
Circuit.! Both cases presented the issue of whether the Board was 
correct in finding that employees were discriminatorily discharged be-
cause of their union activity in the absence of any direct evidence that 
the employer knew of this activity. In Malone the court upheld the 
Board, finding that the inference of knowledge of such activity was 
justified. In Antell the Board had relied on the "small plant doctrine," 
under which it inferred knowledge because of "the small number of 
employees ip the store."2 The First Circuit reversed the Board and 
refused to apply the doctrine to the facts. "To apply a small plant rule 
in such circumstances would in effect put an entirely arbitrary burden 
on operators of small establishments - a burden that we could not 
support."3 
§16.9. Grievances: Arbitrability. Two cases before the First Cir-
cuit involved the recurring issue of the arbitrability of grievances under 
a collective bargaining agreement. In Trailways of New England, Inc. 
v. Amalgamated Assn.l the court affirmed the district court's order to 
arbitrate since the jurisdiction of the Board was clear although the 
employer claimed it had such a strong case on the merits that "no 
reasonable man could find against it." In Camden Industries, Inc. v. 
Carpenters Local Union, No. 1688,2 in which the question of the arbi-
trator's jurisdiction was doubtful, the court also affirmed an order to 
arbitrate, but noted that after the arbitrator had found the subsidiary 
facts, the question of arbitrability may then be reviewed judicially on 
a petition to vacate or enforce the award. 
D. MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS 
§16.10. Employment security. The Supreme Judicial Court 
handed down two cases under the Massachusetts Employment Security 
Act during the 1966 SURVEY year, but neither was of major impact. 
DeFino v. Director of the Division of Employment Securityl involved 
a procedural point concerning the joinder of the United States as a 
party in proceedings in the Massachusetts District Court. Joinder was 
sought by a former federal employee under a federal-state arrangement 
providing that the Massachusetts Division of Employment Security act 
as agent for the Federal Government in administering unemployment 
compensation claims by federal employers. The second case was Faria 
v. Director of the Division of Employment Security.2 The claimant of 
§16.8. 1358 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1966). 
2Id. at 882. 
3 Ibid. 
§16.9. l353 F.2d 180 (1st Cir. 1965). 
2353 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1965). 
§16.l0. 1 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 621, 215 N.E.2d 757. 
2350 Mass. 397, 215 N.E.2d 90 (1966). 
9
Kearns: Chapter 16: Labor Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1966
242 1966 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW §16.l1 
unemployment benefits owned a one-fourth interest in and was presi-
dent of a carpentry corporation (his three brothers owned the remain-
ing interest). During a business "slowdown," i.e., a "dull season," the 
claimant was unable to obtain work as a carpenter from his own cor-
poration or from other employers. The Division of Employment Secu-
rity and the district court denied him benefits on the ground that he 
was "not attached to the labor market in the broad sense." The Su-
preme Judicial Court reversed, pointing out that no improper action 
by the claimant or the corporation was shown, e.g., there was no evi-
dence that he or his corporation caused his unemployment. The Court 
refused to entertain an argument that allowing unemployment benefits 
to be paid to employees who own and control the employing corpora-
tion offers the opportunity for abuse. It is for the legislature to decide 
to what extent financial interest in the business of a claimant's princi-
pal employer should be a disqualification for unemployment benefits. 
§16.11. Minimum wage and overtime law. There is an exception 
for "garagemen" under the Massachusetts statute requiring overtime 
at time and one-half for work in excess of 40 hours per week. In Fitz-
Inn Auto Parks, Inc. v. Commissioner of Labor & Industries,! the Su-
preme Judicial Court determined that parking lot attendants were 
not "garagemen" within the meaning of this exception. During the 
litigation, the legislature amended the statute to provide for coverage 
of parking lot attendants.2 The Court's decision is of interest on one 
point of interpretation of the state minimum wage and overtime law. 
The employer argued that the intent of the legislature was to include 
within the exceptions those businesses that could not operate on an 
overtime-pay basis because they must be open long hours but cannot 
charge customers a higher price for the services rendered during the 
extra hours. The Court rejected this argument with the comment: 
"The legislative intent does not appear to us to be related to the price 
charged the customers for the services rendered." 
E. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§16.12. Miscellaneous. During the 1966 session of the Massachu-
setts legislature no important labor relations bills were enacted. The 
Municipal Employees Collective Bargaining Actl was amended to re-
move the disqualification on police from engaging in collective bar-
gaining with a city or town.2 The law restricting the hours of labor 
for women and children3 was amended to remove these restrictions 
upon women who are declared by the Commissioner of Labor to be 
employed in a professional, executive, administrative, or supervisory 
§16.ll. l350 Mass. 39, 213 N.E.2d 245 (1965). 
2 Acts of 1965, c. 416, amending G.L., c. 151, §IA. 
§16.l2. 1 G.L., c. 149, §178G. 
2 Acts of 1966, c. 156. The public employees covered by the act are prohibited 
from striking. 
3 G.L., c. 149, §56. 
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capacity or as a personal secretary.4 The weekly payment of wages lawll 
was amended to include within the definition of "wages" any holiday 
or vacation payments owed an employee under an oral or written 
agreement.6 Penalties for violation of the minimum wage law7 were 
increased.s The law authorizing payroll deductions from state, county, 
or municipal employees' salaries on account of union dues9 was modi-
fied to include permission for checkoff of such dues from nurses' wages 
to the Massachusetts Nurses Association.1O The minimum wage lawll 
was amended to increl,lse the present minimum hourly wage to $1.40, 
as of February 1, 1967, and to $l.60, effective February 1, 1968.12 
There were two amendments to the Unemployment Compensation 
Law. The first permits employees in one union to collect benefits 
when another craft union's strike shuts down the project on which 
both were working.13 The second extends from one week to two 
weeks the period during which an employee may continue to receive 
benefits after he becomes disabled by illness while unemployed.14 
§16.13. Antidiscrimination legislation. The Massachusetts statute 
prohibiting discrimination1 was modified in respect to age discrimina-
tion by extending the protection of the law prohibiting discrimination 
because of age to persons 40 years of age.2 
The powers of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimina-
tion3 were extended to permit the giving of advisory opinions upon 
questions submitted to it by any employer, employment agency, or 
labor organization concerning whether a particular requirement for 
employment involving sex, age, or creed is a bona fide occupational 
qualification.4 
A third act,1I amending the anti-discrimination law,6 provides that 
the keeping of records by an employer as to race, color, or national 
origin as may be prescribed by the Federal Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission and the Federal Fair Employment Practices 
Act will not be a violation of the Massachusetts anti-discrimination law. 
4 Acts of 1966, c. 183. 
5 G.L., c. 149, §148. 
6 Acts of 1966, c. 319. 
7 G.L., c. 151, §19. 
S Acts of 1966, c. 22. 
9 G.L., c. 180, §17(a). 
10 Acts of 1966, c. 39. 
11 G.L., c. 151. 
12 Acts of 1966, c. 679. The Massachusetts and federal minimum wage rates will 
be the same beginning February 1, 1967. See §16.l supra; 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§15.7 n.2. 
13 Acts of 1966, c. 382. 
14 Id. c. 528. 
§16.13. 1 G.L., c. 151B. 
2 Acts of 1966, c. 405. 
3 G.L., c. 15lB, §3. 
4 Acts of 1966, c. 410. 
1\ Id., c. 351. 
6 G.L., c. 151B, §4. 
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